Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder

Analyse & Kritik 12 (1):34-46 (1990)
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Abstract

I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. While explaining the various elements of the OSM-III-R definition of mental disorders, I show that even though ( 1) not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs or delusions, (2) not all irrational actions are due to mental disorders, and (3) not all mental disorders lead to irrational actions, there is a close conceptual connection between irrationality and mental disorders because both involve suffering or an increased risk of suffering an evil or harm, independent of the circumstances one is in.

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Philosophy in Medicine.John Harris, Charles M. Culver & Bernard Gert - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (132):307.

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