Propositions, representation, and truth

Synthese 196 (3):1019-1043 (2019)
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Abstract

Theories of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances are committed to the thesis that sentences or other representations true in all and only the same circumstances express the same proposition. Theories of propositions as complex, structured entities are not committed to this thesis. As a result, structured propositions can play a role in our theories of language and thought that sets of truth-supporting circumstances cannot play. To illustrate this difference, I sketch a theory of transparent, non-deflationary truth consistent with some theories of structured propositions, but inconsistent with any theory of propositions as sets of truth-supporting circumstances.

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10.1007/s11229-017-1492-y

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Geoff Georgi
West Virginia University

Citations of this work

States of affairs and our connection with the good.Miles Tucker - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (2):694-714.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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