Abstract

“Why is there something rather than nothing?” This is perhaps one of the most annoying questions posed in recent times by and to philosophers. It has troubled at least two major thinkers in the last and in this century, namely the romantic idealist Friedrich Schelling and the contemporary existentialist Martin Heidegger, since it was first formulated by Leibniz. We can easily get rid of the question as being simplistic; since although it may be true that nothing is simpler than something, we have no notion of what the simplicity of nothing might consist in. Or we can say that the question is related to the theological answer of a benevolent creator, and hence is not able even to be asked within the ambient of the finite human understanding. Or we may say that the question is supremely hypothetical, in that it would presuppose what is not, in fact, the case; and philosophy can be concerned only with what is. Furthermore, to ask the question in any genuine fashion, the nonexistence of the questioner would seem to be required. The question, therefore, appears Zen-like: “What is the answer to a question posed by a nonexistent questioner?”