Pure Synthesis and the Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception

Kant Studien 113 (1):8-39 (2022)
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Abstract

Kant calls the Principle of the Synthetic Unity of Apperception the “highest point” to which we “must affix all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic and, after it, transcendental philosophy.” In this article, I offer an original interpretation of this “supreme principle.” My argument is twofold. First, I argue that the common identification of this principle with the “I think” or even the form of the I think misses the basis on which this principle is capable of grounding Kant’s transcendental deduction. It must be understood as a purely formal, transcendental principle. Second, I argue that this highest principle must be understood as a purely formal principle of pure synthesis in order for Kant’s account of the mind to lay valid claim to such spontaneity without invoking the very dogmatic idealism that he critiques. The reduction of this principle to the real I think, or even to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, undermines the basic distinction on which Kant’s deduction depends. I pay particular attention to important, recent arguments from Longuenesse on the TUA, Williams on the Original Unity of Apperception, Allison and Pollok on the status of a priori principles, and McLear on the claim that unity necessarily presupposes synthesis.

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Gerad Gentry
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz

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Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason.Colin McLear - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):79-110.

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