Aspects of the unity of consciousness and everyday memory failures

Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):372-385 (2006)
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Abstract

We argue that analyzing everyday memory failures in terms of the “unity of consciousness” can elucidate the bases of such failures. A perfect unity amongst one’s mental states is rare. In extreme cases the unity of consciousness can breakdown in dramatic fashion , but such breakdowns also occur in less dramatic ways that affect us in everyday life. For example, disruptions in the unity of consciousness can result in everyday memory failures, such as forgetting to put on a tie for an important formal meeting. After providing some philosophical background into the notions of “unity of consciousness” and “functionalism,” we offer preliminary analyses of three examples of everyday memory failure. We then introduce and develop what we call the “unity model” of memory failure and show how it explains the examples. We also describe different ways that unity can break down which, in turn, can lead to memory failure and inappropriate behavior. We then show how slips of action and other kinds of cognitive failures differ from everyday memory failures. Finally, we examine alternative models arguing that the unity model is preferable, and then show how our model is consistent with some experimental results

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Rocco J. Gennaro
University of Southern Indiana

Citations of this work

Two Unities of Consciousness.Elizabeth Schechter - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):197-218.
Does consciousness even appear unified?Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2023 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 58 (4):217-224.

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
Categorization of action slips.Donald A. Norman - 1981 - Psychological Review 88 (1):1-15.
Actions not as planned: The price of automatization.J. T. Reason - 1979 - In Geoffrey Underwood & Robin Stevens (eds.), Aspects of consciousness. New York: Academic Press. pp. 1--67.
Brain bisection and personal identity.Roland Puccetti - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (April):339-55.

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