Quantifying proportionality and the limits of higher-level causation and explanation

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (3):573-601 (2023)
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Abstract

Supporters of the autonomy of higher-level causation (or explanation) often appeal to proportionality, arguing that higher-level causes are more proportional than their lower-level realizers. Recently, measures based on information theory and causal modeling have been proposed that allow one to shed new light on proportionality and the related notion of specificity. In this paper we apply ideas from this literature to the issue of higher vs. lower-level causation (and explanation). Surprisingly, proportionality turns out to be irrelevant for the question of whether higher-level causes (or explanations) can be autonomous; specificity is a much more informative notion for this purpose.

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Author Profiles

Markus Eronen
University of Groningen
Alexander Gebharter
Marche Polytechnic University

Citations of this work

Coherent Causal Control: A New Distinction within Causation.Marcel Weber - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (4):69.
Host Specificity in Biological Control.Thomas Blanchard - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Unification and explanation from a causal perspective.Alexander Gebharter & Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 99 (C):28-36.

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References found in this work

Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.

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