The Logical Connection Argument and de re Necessity

American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (4):349 - 354 (1975)
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Abstract

The logical connection argument holds that factors which appear causally connected can be shown not to be so, At least when described in certain ways, If these factors are logically connected when so described. I argue that normal formulations of the logical connection argument confuse propositions and events. Moreover, When it is clarified in terms of "de re" necessity, It requires strong ontological assumptions for which no support is given and about the intelligibility of which there is reasonable question. I conclude that the logical connection argument fails to give any reason for excluding any causal hypothesis

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Citations of this work

Emotion, emotional feeling and passive body change.William D. Gean - 1979 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 9 (1):39–51.
An Objection to the Revision of the Logical Connection Argument.Jig-Chen Lee - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4):725 - 733.
Reviving the Logical Connection Argument.James Otten - 1977 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):725-743.

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