Epistemic Purism and Doxastic Puritanism

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 37:9-13 (2018)
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Abstract

The pragmatist epistemologist is supposed to defend the idea that there is no pure epistemic activity and, thereby, that the way we form our beliefs does not have to be assessed according to aims, or norms that rest on the illusory denial of the pragmatic encroachment of any inquiry. According to the pragmatist, the kind of epistemic purism that is widely endorsed in contemporary epistemology has in fact no other raison d’être than the doxastic puritanism that appears in W. K. Clifford’s ethical principle. But a belief being defective has in fact nothing to do neither with the kind of practical factors that pragmatism so conceived, considers as relevant nor with the rules or values that epistemic puritanism reveres. Between believing that P and believing that E establishes that P, there is no such thing as the distance there is between practical reasons to φ and φ-ing. The position I defend is closer to Peirce’s pragmatism than to any other pragmatist approach. Among other things, it explains why C. S. Peirce’s thesis that: 1) The “real man of science” does not give any weight to practical stakes in his inquiries not only goes hand in hand with the thesis that 2) He never believes of any hypothesis that it is true, but also with the thesis that 3) The inquiry to which such a man devotes is infinite. Peirce is right from an epistemic point of view to praise men, whose life is devoted to the disinterested search for truth.

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Benoit Gaultier
University of Zürich

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