Abstract

Ideals of equality assume a degree of similarity among individuals. Because the idea of sameness among human beings is at the core of equality theory, those concerned with differences have been skeptical of the value of equality frameworks. Feminists have recently argued, for example, that equality frameworks can be damaging precisely because they assume a false similarity among men and women. The ideal of equality, they hold, can serve to hide significant differences in the lives of men and women. ;In this dissertation, I argue that the feminist rejection of equality is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of what equality means. In order to be able to identify and respond to injustice, a sense of the requirements of equality of persons are necessary. Only when we think about the important ways that we share in equal personhood can we continue to make claims about what constitutes justice and injustice. ;I develop this idea of sameness by exploring three feminist debates on equality including pregnancy and workplace equality, abortion, and pornography. By analyzing the needs addressed in these three issue areas as human needs that are significant for all rather than needs specific to women, I begin to build an idea of how we are similarly constituted as equals from a feminist perspective. To develop the idea of equality of persons, I turn to a Rawlsian conception of moral personality. Specifically, I argue that as moral equals we have the ability for "gender reflection," which I describe as a mode of impartial thought that can be attentive to gender concerns. ;In the concluding chapter, I discuss some of the important problems that are raised by a Rawlsian framework. Specifically, I discuss the conflict between a commitment to value pluralism and traditional rejections of women's equality. This problem, I argue, cannot be resolved within the confines of Rawls' framework as it stands but nevertheless requires further analysis for feminist political theorists