A new paradox of belief

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper I raise a paradox of belief inspired by Kripke’s ‘paradox of knowledge', which states that knowledge seems to make permissible an intuitively unacceptable form of dogmatism. This paradox of belief is based on an intuitively correct principle of doxastic coherence. My aim is to show that this paradox contributes to elucidating the puzzling nature of belief.

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Benoit Gaultier
University of Zürich

Citations of this work

The Ethics of Suspension of Judgement.Léna Mudry - 2025 - Dissertation, University of Zürich

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Noûs 11 (4):421-430.
Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.

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