Of minimal things: studies on the notion of relation

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press (1999)
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Abstract

Exploring and reassessing the philosophical notion of relation, Of Minimal Things views relation as the minimal and elemental theme and structure of philosophy, in contrast to the scholastic, ontological conception of relation as a thing of diminished being. Drawing radical conclusions from the classical understanding of relation as a being-toward-another, it argues that rethinking relation engages the very possibility and limits of philosophical discourse. In the author's studies of Nietzsche, Benjamin, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida and Blanchot, relation is shown to be central to their thought and to undergo elaborations that escape the ontological, categorial, and formalist ways in which the concept has traditionally been interpreted. Studying the writings of Mallarme; and Kafka, the author argues that philosophy necessarily opens up to and is implicated in its others, one such possible other being literature.

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