Abstract

The theory of truth in the dissertation is a form of realism without correspondence, the only one of its kind. To date only correspondence theories have been realistic. A realistic theory of truth is one which specifies truth in terms of the relationship truths have to that which they are about. Typically, correspondence theorists hold that truths are about facts or reality and that it is the correspondence relationship between the truths and what they are about that makes them true. In contrast, all non-correspondence theories , specify truth without any reference to what truths are about. So none of them are realistic. ;Non-correspondence theorists have abandoned correspondence for good reason; the problems raised by correspondence have resisted all attempted solutions. But, in also abandoning realism, they all bear a very great burden of their own; They must, somehow, make sense of truth without specifying any sort of relationship between truths and that which they are about. The situation, then, may be summed up as follows: All past realistic theories of truth are burdened by their commitment to correspondence, while all past non-correspondence theories are burdened by burden of their own: They must, somehow, make sense of truth without specifying any sort of relationship between truths and that which they are about. The situation, then, may be summed up as follows: All past realistic theories of truth are burdened by their commitment to correspondence, while all past non-correspondence theories are burdened by the need to ignore the relationship between truths and that which they are about. ;By embracing realism without correspondence, the theory in the dissertation avoids both burdens. It holds that statements are the vehicles of truth and that their truth depends upon what they are about viz., their referents. So it is realistic. But it makes no reference to correspondence. It simply states the following: A statement is true iff its referent or the relationship between its referents is of the respected sort. Thus "John sits" is true iff the referent belongs to the respected class of things to which "sits" may be applied. Statements are themselves specified as classes of statement-utterances having the same referent and same instructional meaning and statement-utterances are specified via a new theory of speech acts. Finally, fresh theories of meaning and reference are offered and defended against W. V. Quine's claim that meaning and reference are inscrutable