Reassessing Kripke’s Anti-Materialism and Almog’s Challenge

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 80 (3):815-818 (2024)
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Abstract

In this text, we point out some obvious commitments of the identity theory of mind which allow the identity theorist to sidestep Saul Kripke’s famous anti-materialist argument. We also argue that a recent paper by Joseph Almog fails to undermine Kripke’s internalism about sensations.

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Author Profiles

Brian Jonathan Garrett
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
Jeremiah Joven Joaquin
De La Salle University

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