(Dis)solving the binding problem

Philosophical Psychology 14 (4):381 – 392 (2001)
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Abstract

The binding problem is to explain how information processed by different sensory systems is brought together to unify perception. The problem has two sides. First, we want to explain phenomenal binding: the fact that we experience a single world rather than separate perceptual fields for each sensory modality. Second, we must solve a functional problem: to explain how a neural net like the brain links instances to types. I argue that phenomenal binding and functional binding require very different treatments. The puzzle of phenomenal binding rests on a confusion and so can be dissolved. So only functional binding deserves explanation. The general solution to that problem is that information to be bound is arrayed along different dimensions. So sensory coding into separate topographic maps facilitates functional binding and there is no need based on the unity of perception for special mechanisms that bring "back together" information in different maps

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James W. Garson
University of Houston