Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?

Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423 (2013)
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Abstract

Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the ). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.

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reprint Gallotti, Mattia (2013) "Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36(4):422-423

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Mattia Gallotti
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.

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References found in this work

Social cognition in the we-mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris D. Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.

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