The Ontological Contexts for the Ethical Elements in "Being and Time" and "Being and Nothingness"
Dissertation, New School for Social Research (
1983)
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Abstract
Both Heidegger in Being and Time and Sartre in Being and Nothingness deny that those works have an ethical character, despite the ethical tone and vocabulary of each work. This thesis examines the status of these seemingly ethical elements within the contexts of the ontological theories contained in the works. ;The comparative analysis of the works is based upon a consideration of Heidegger's rejection of and Sartre's espousal of a version of the Cartesian cogito which would isolate human consciousness from the world. The linking of man and world in Heidegger and the separation of man into a realm of pure intentional freedom by Sartre are found to be the source of the profound ontological--and in the end ethical--differences which separate these philosophers. ;In neither case, however, does that ethical relevance exist on the level of ontology. In Heidegger, the modes of existence of inauthenticity and authenticity are equiprimordial ontologically, and in Sartre good and bad faith are both manifestations of an ontologically based human freedom that cannot be escaped. With regard to ontology, all courses of action that a human being can take are equally a manifestation of being. ;Although an ethics is not directly founded upon the ontologies, the ethical connotations of the works remain significant. Brought outside the ontological realm, the acknowledgment of one's nature, finitude for Heidegger and freedom for Sartre, is implied by each to be evaluatively superior to the avoidance of anxiety through the refusal of such acknowledgment. The primary ethical significance of each of the works would involve the acknowledment of and the acting in accordance with one's ontological nature. For Heidegger this would involve maintaining a sense of one's finitude and one's lack of ultimate foundations, whereas for Sartre it would involve acknowledging oneself as the source of all values. In neither case, however, would the ethical elements involve a specific set of precepts or a definite rule for moral judgments; an attempt to derive such a guideline would, in fact, be an example of inauthenticity for both