Abstract

In Chapter Four I examine what types of war are allowable. I argue that in the absence of material conditions necessary for formation of a world state, formation of many states is necessary: under these conditions the preeminent obligation of each state in relation with others is defense of its own sovereignty. Wars to protect the conditions for sovereignty are allowable; wars against aggression, wars for defensible frontiers, wars to protect vital interests, etc., are allowable. ;In Chapter Five I offer a proof for the claim that there ought to be a federated world state. I define a "federated state" as a state whose sovereignty is not subject to veto by its members. I extend Chapter One to argue that the obligation of universal, equal respect applies also to states. The proof consists in the positing of a possible world state as a precondition for universal, equal respect of sovereignty of all states. I also characterize material conditions necessary for formation of a world state and possible measures to formation of a world state. ;In Chapter Two I argue that there ought to be a state: I argue that conditions under a state are more conducive to maximization of human freedom than are conditions under a hypothetical state of nature: thus establishment and maintenance of a state is mandatory. I do not assert that there was in fact at some time a state of nature; rather I examine what types of actions would be allowable if there were a state of nature. ;In Chapter Three I examine principles of justice under a constitutional state. I argue that universal equal distribution of rights is a basic principle of justice derivable from the categorical imperative. I argue that in relatively poor societies exigencies of the society's need to survive or to better life make permissible various types of social divisions, whereas in certain advanced industrial societies the principle of equal distribution of rights holds without exception. ;In this dissertation I defend the claim in political theory that there ought to be a federated world state. ;In the first chapter I take the fundamental principle of obligation to be the first formulation of Kant's categorical imperative. I argue that this principle with its derivative principle of rights applies to states as well as to individual persons. I argue that duties are subject to exceptions either due to one duty being in conflict with a second duty or due to the absence of material conditions requisite for the performance of the duty