Abstract

Nietzsche is read as having asserted that there is no truth, that there are no facts to which propositions might correspond, instead, there are only interpretations. It is generally recognized that there is a problem inherent in asserting that there are no facts, that there is no truth and that all our beliefs about the world are erroneous. If Nietzsche means to make an assertion that there is no truth and if he wishes us to take this assertion to be true, then it seems that he is attempting to indicate the "facts of the matter." Yet, it is said, Nietzsche argues that there are no facts to which his own assertions could correspond. ;It appears that Nietzsche's philosophy is self-referentially paradoxical, that his thought was, consciously or unconsciously, self-contradictory. In my dissertation I present a number of attempts which have been made to rescue Nietzsche from the problem of self-referential paradox. I argue that none of the proposed solutions satisfactorily dissolves the problem of self-referential paradox in Nietzsche. After demonstrating the inadequacies of the various proposed solutions, I offer my own solution to the problem of self-referential paradox in Nietzsche. My solution rests on the contention that the problem is only an apparent problem. My solution depends upon the ways in which Nietzsche frames his arguments. Specifically, his use of "maybe's," his speaking in terms of possibilities, his frequent admissions that an idea is his idea, all convince me that Nietzsche is not making assertions which are to be taken as assertions of the "facts of the matter." Nietzsche makes use of hypotheses and "thought experiments" in order to challenge the reader's received opinions. Nietzsche poses possibilities which lead the reader to doubt. In doing so Nietzsche is not asserting that his viewpoints are true. He is offering alternative "perspectives" designed to challenge the reader's assumptions. Nietzsche's rhetoric and style are "nonassertive." Once one comes to notice this, the problem of self-referential paradox dissipates