Abstract

I assess the prospects of a substantive notion of moral perception in which there is both moral value to perception and perception of moral value. This notion of perception runs counter to the traditional view, but the traditional view rests on a dualism between the descriptive and the evaluative. This dualism distorts our phenomenal experience, rests on assumptions undermined by critiques of empiricism, and undermines notions basic to our moral seriousness by creating an obstacle to a satisfactory moral theory in the form of the is-ought gap. Setting aside the dualism allows a substantive notion of moral perception to emerge. The central features are visible in the work of Francis Hutcheson, John McDowell, and Lawrence Blum. Moral perception provides a link between facts and values, cognition and volition. The central feature is that our phenomenal experience comes to us shaped by our emotional commitments and moral concepts, such that in some cases one can "see" a situation as calling for a moral response. Issues I address include the resemblance between moral qualities and sensory perception and the importance of a role for development in our capacity for moral perception. In addition, recognition of the role of perceptual capacities in our moral responses diminish the role that moral principles might play, but does not eliminate a possible role for principles. I critically examine challenges to the possibility of moral perception from Simon Blackburn, showing that a substantive notion of moral perception and moral concepts remains viable in the face of his criticisms. In the final chapter, I draw together elements of what seems to be a promising approach, drawing from the discussion of Hutcheson, McDowell and Blum. I find that recognition that perception can be a moral matter, coupled with a modest anthropocentric moral realism, provides a more promising avenue of validating our moral seriousness than exists on the traditional view