Les concepts essentiellement contestés

Philosophie 122 (3):9-33 (2014)
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Abstract

Tout usage particulier d’un concept provenant du sens commun ou des sciences naturelles est susceptible d’être contesté pour de bonnes ou mauvaises raisons ; mais quelle que soit la force des raisons, elles impliquent généralement la supposition d’un accord concernant le type d’usage qui est approprié au concept en question, entre son utilisateur et quiconque conteste l’usage particulier qui en est...

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