S5-denying Approach to Relativized Metaphysical Modality

Manuscrito 43 (1):1-40 (2020)
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Abstract

This paper is organised as follows: first, I present Salmon’s theory of modality and compare it with the standard interpretation of modality: ‘the nonrelativized S5-friendly interpretation of metaphysical modality’. Second, I explain Murray and Wilson’s ‘two-dimensional S5-friendly interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality’. In the third and last part, I put forward a few arguments against Murray and Wilson’s attempt to provide an essentialist S5-friendly theory for modality. In general, this paper argues that if one wants to hold an essentialist theory for relativized modality, then his best option in the market right now is to stick with Salmon’s proposal, which better represents a genuine essentialist interpretation of relativized metaphysical modality.

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Fernando Furtado
Federal University of Minas Gerais

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References found in this work

Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
The Logic of What Might Have Been.Nathan Salmon - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (1):3-34.
Parts as Essential to Their Wholes.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 26 (4):581 - 603.
A Problem in Possible Worlds Semantics.David Kaplan - 1995 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Diana Raffman & Nicholas Asher, Modality, morality, and belief: essays in honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 41-52.

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