Van Fraassen's dissolution of Putnam's model-theoretic argument

Philosophy of Science 66 (1):158-164 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Bas van Fraassen has recently argued for a "dissolution" of Hilary Putnam's well-known model-theoretic argument. In this paper I argue that, as it stands, van Fraassen's reply to Putnam is unsuccessful. Nonetheless, it suggests the form a successful response might take

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,225

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

What is the model-theoretic argument?David Leech Anderson - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (6):311-322.
Van Fraassen's Semanticism.Brendan P. Minogue - 1984 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984:115 - 121.
Putting Reference Beyond Belief.José L. Zalabardo - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (3):221-257.
Van Fraassen's modal model of quantum mechanics.Nancy Cartwright - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (2):199-202.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
123 (#176,576)

6 months
7 (#704,497)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Mathias Frisch
Universität Hannover

Citations of this work

On the rational reconstruction of our theoretical knowledge.William Demopoulos - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):371-403.
Users, Structures, and Representation.Mathias Frisch - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):285-306.
Scientific Realism, the Galilean Strategy, and Representation.Mauricio Suárez - 2009 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):269-292.
A realistic look at Putnam's argument against realism.Vadim Batitsky - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (3):299-321.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Putnam’s paradox.David Lewis - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.

Add more references