- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Using Mathematics to Explain a Scientific Theory
Philosophia Mathematica 24 (2):185-213 (2016)
Abstract
We answer three questions: 1. Can we give a wholly mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon? 2. Can we give a wholly mathematical explanation for a whole physical theory? 3. What is gained or lost in giving a wholly, or partially, mathematical explanation of a phenomenon or a scientific theory? To answer these questions we look at a project developed by Hajnal Andréka, Judit Madarász, István Németi and Gergely Székely. They, together with collaborators, present special relativity theory in a three-sorted first-order formal language.Author Profiles
Other Versions
No versions found
Links
PhilArchive
External links
(no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver
- Configure custom resolver
My notes
Similar books and articles
On the epistemological significance of the hungarian project.Michèle Friend - 2015 - Synthese 192 (7):2035-2051.
Can we have mathematical understanding of physical phenomena?Gabriel Târziu - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (1):91-109.
A Counterfactual Approach to Explanation in Mathematics.Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan & David Ripley - 2020 - Philosophia Mathematica 28 (1):1-34.
How Mathematics Can Make a Difference.Sam Baron, Mark Colyvan & David Ripley - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
Is Mathematics a Domain for Philosophers of Explanation?Erik Weber & Joachim Frans - 2017 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 48 (1):125-142.
The Prospects for a Monist Theory of Non-causal Explanation in Science and Mathematics.Alexander Reutlinger, Mark Colyvan & Karolina Krzyżanowska - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1773-1793.
In the Footsteps of Hilbert: The Andréka-Németi Group’s Logical Foundations of Theories in Physics.Giambattista Formica & Michèle Friend - 2021 - In Judit Madarász & Gergely Székely (eds.), Hajnal Andréka and István Németi on Unity of Science: From Computing to Relativity Theory Through Algebraic Logic. Springer. pp. 383-408.
Indexing and Mathematical Explanation.Alan Baker & Mark Colyvan - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (3):323-334.
Mathematical Explanation by Law.Sam Baron - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):683-717.
Assessing the explanatory power of naturalism in addressing ultimate questions.Javad Darvish Aghajani - 2021 - Philosophy and Conflict Studie 37 (2):17-28.
Analytics
Added to PP
2015-08-18
Downloads
82 (#255,485)
6 months
4 (#1,247,585)
2015-08-18
Downloads
82 (#255,485)
6 months
4 (#1,247,585)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Citations of this work
Indispensability and explanation: an overview and introduction.Daniele Molinini, Fabrice Pataut & Andrea Sereni - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2):317-332.
Groups of Worldview Transformations Implied by Einstein’s Special Principle of Relativity over Arbitrary Ordered Fields.Judit X. Madarász, Mike Stannett & Gergely Székely - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-28.
Investigations of isotropy and homogeneity of spacetime in first-order logic.Judit X. Madarász, Mike Stannett & Gergely Székely - 2022 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 173 (9):103153.
References found in this work
Mathematics and Scientific Representation.Christopher Pincock - 2011 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena?Alan Baker - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):223-238.
Mathematical Explanation in Science.Alan Baker - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):611-633.
An Inferential Conception of the Application of Mathematics.Otávio Bueno & Mark Colyvan - 2011 - Noûs 45 (2):345-374.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-559df78dcc-zvk2b uwo