The place of appraisal in emotion

Cognition and Emotion 7 (3):357-387 (1993)
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Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.

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Citations of this work

Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases.Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):1-20.
Emotion.Ronald de Sousa - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On the Causal Role of Appraisal in Emotion.Agnes Moors - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (2):132-140.
Pre-emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):771-794.
Emotion and Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-27.

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