The Foundations of Modality: From Propositions to Possible Worlds

Oxford: Oxford University Press (2023)
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Abstract

This book develops an argument for a foundational theory of modality using higher-order logic. The use of higher-order logic in metaphysics is motivated, and a particular higher-order logic is introduced. Fine-grained theories of propositional individuation are shown to be problematic, and a course-grained theory of propositional individuation is defended. On the basis of this theory, it is argued that the metaphysical necessities can be delineated using purely logical terms; by adding an actuality operator, it is shown that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. The theoretical role of possible worlds is articulated, and shown to be satisfied by maximal propositions if it satisfied by anything; the existence of such maximal propositions is demonstrated using plural propositional quantification. The resulting theory reduces metaphysical modal terms to higher-order logical terms, and thereby vindicates a widespread modal conception of metaphysics.

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Peter Fritz
University College London

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