Science, causation, and value

Philosophy of Science 14 (3):179-180 (1947)
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Abstract

The association of determinism with the coming of experimental science in the modern world was an unnecessary carry-over of certain aspects of the medieval belief that the aim of knowledge is to grasp or contemplate “eternal truth.” If we take a science such as chemistry or physics as typical instead of astronomy, it would seem that control of actual concrete transformations is the acid experimental test rather than prediction of “inevitable” future events. The latter surely has the smell of pre-scientific prophecy. If so, and if we choose to base our interpretation of science and our philosophy of nature on this consideration, we can avoid determinism without in any way limiting the efficacy or potential universality of science. At the same time we avoid the traditional metaphysical or theological notion of “free will.”

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