Abstract

Quassim Cassam argues that contemporary philosophers largely neglect the kind of “substantial” self-knowledge most people care about – knowledge of my character, beliefs, and desires – in favor of “trivial” forms of it that are nevertheless philosophically illuminating. This article takes up Cassam's challenge to turn toward accounts of substantial self-knowledge, and, building on the work of Gadamer, makes the case that any such account has to address the question of the historical formation of the knowing subject. That historical formation – our ‘historicity’ – both erects barriers to self-knowledge and serves as a source of it, and raises the question of how much self-knowledge is even possible for historically situated knowers. To answer that, I take up Collingwood's claim that the aim of historical research is self-knowledge, and his view that, since its scientific turn in the nineteenth century, history has enabled self-knowledge of an especially significant sort. Developing these and other ideas in Collingwood, I draw a distinction between what I call “historico-philosophical” self-knowledge, which includes knowledge of our historicity, and “garden-variety historical” self-knowledge, which is focused on the particular historical formations in which we find ourselves. I argue that both count as substantial self-knowledge and round out an understanding of myself that includes any grasp I might have of my character, beliefs, and desires.