Inquiry and Belief

Noûs 53 (2):296-315 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an inquiry or question settled.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,458

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Creationist Controversy: The Interrelation of Inquiry and Belief.Langdon Gilkey - 1982 - Science, Technology and Human Values 7 (3):67-71.
Belief and Settledness.Wooram Lee - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Having a Hunch.Howard Sankey - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):215-219.
Reconciling the Epistemic and the Zetetic.Eliran Haziza - 2022 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):93-100.
Cognitive Architectures, Kinds, and Belief.Joshua Mugg - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-26

Downloads
657 (#40,025)

6 months
52 (#100,106)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jane Friedman
New York University

Citations of this work

Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2).
Questions in Action.Daniel Hoek - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (3):113-143.
The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.

View all 150 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.

View all 22 references / Add more references