A green Parrot is just as much a red Herring as a white shoe: A note on confirmation, background knowledge and the logico-probabilistic approach

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):531-535 (1988)
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10.1093/bjps/39.4.531

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Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Ethics 93 (3):613-615.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1982 - Erkenntnis 18 (1):105-130.
Bayesianism and support by novel facts.Colin Howson - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):245-251.
Some recent objections to the bayesian theory of support.Colin Howson - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3):305-309.

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