Philosophical Expertise

In David Coady & James Chase (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Applied Epistemology. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 297-306 (2018)
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Abstract

Philosophical expertise consists in knowledge, but it is controversial what this knowledge consists in. I focus on three issues: the extent and nature of knowledge of philosophical truths, how this philosophical knowledge is related to philosophical progress, and skeptical challenges to philosophical knowledge.

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Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.

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