On the Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument

Abstract

I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I describe first Bostrom's Simulation Argument in detail and its inherent problem. I recall then the implicit analogy underlying the Simulation argument. I show then the inadequacy of this analogy, by pointing out a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument and its underlying urn analogy. I point out that such disanalogy is also present within the Emerald case, another thought experiment imagined by John Leslie. I proceed then to build an alternative analogy, which fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument. I draw lastly the consequences of the presence of two alternative analogies on the conclusion of the Simulation Argument

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