On the concept of childhood in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations

Wittgenstein-Studien 13 (1):111-136 (2022)
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Abstract

In the sparse literature that is concerned with Wittgenstein’s views regarding children and childhood, in his later work, it is often suggested that Wittgenstein presents, or at least is committed to, a romantic notion of the child according to which children should be conceived of as innocent beings who are ontologically different from adults. In this paper I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks do not support such an interpretation. First, I investigate the arguments for this view presented by Stanley Cavell, Yasushi Maruyama, and Philip Shields. Second, I consider an anti-essentialist understanding of Wittgenstein’s concept of childhood that has been suggested in opposition to the treatment of the child as the ‘ontological other’ and argue that Wittgenstein refers to the child as intermediate link with which to state grammatical facts. In contrast to these various views, I hold, third, that the PI is committed to a strong and substantial concept of childhood. I argue for this claim on the basis of the ‘Motto’ of the PI; Wittgenstein’s reference to the philosopher Augustine; and the use of ‘primitive’. I conclude that Wittgenstein’s concept of childhood in his later works neither romanticises nor dispraises the child as the ‘ontological other’.

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Florian Franken Figueiredo
Universidade Nova de Lisboa

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References found in this work

Constructing the Child in Psychology: the Child-as-Primitive in Hall and Piaget.Ann Johnson - 1995 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 26 (2):35-57.
Time and place for philosophy.Stanley Cavell - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (1):51–61.
The philosophical investigations' children.Karín Lesnik-Oberstein - 2003 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 35 (4):381–394.

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