Donnellan on a puzzle about belief

Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):169 - 180 (1994)
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Abstract

Keith Donnellan has advanced an interpretation of Kripke's well-known "Puzzle About Belief" according to which the puzzle concerns the true nature of beliefs. In this paper I argue that the puzzle merely concerns problems that others can have in "reporting" a confused individual's beliefs. I conclude that a new-Fregean account of belief- ascription is best- equipped to solve the puzzle

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10.1007/bf01207664

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Citations of this work

Contradictory Belief and Epistemic Closure Principles.Bryan Frances - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):203–226.

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References found in this work

A puzzle about belief.Saul Aron Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit, Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.

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