Approval and Disapproval

In Virtues and vices. Wiley-Blackwell (1997)
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Abstract

Emotivists and prescriptivists try to explain the meaning of sentences expressing moral judgements in terms of the expression of attitudes, feelings, or resolutions as these could occur in a single individual. It is suggested that that it is necessary to postulate a particular social setting in order to understand the concept of approval, in moral judgement as elsewhere.

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10.1093/0199252866.003.0014

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Citations of this work

The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.

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