The Legitimacy Deficits of the Human Rights Judiciary: Elements and Implications of a Normative Theory

Theoretical Inquiries in Law 14 (2):339-360 (2013)
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Abstract

The Article addresses some of the disagreement concerning the legitimacy of the international human rights judiciary. It lays out some aspects of a theory of legitimacy for the international human rights judiciary that seem relevant to addressing two challenges: First, it is difficult to justify the human rights judiciary by appeal to standard accounts of why states agree to subject themselves to treaties. What is the problem the international human rights judiciary is meant to help solve? Second, the human rights judiciary seems undemocratic and even antidemocratic when it overrules domestic, accountable legislatures. Such international judicial review is therefore sometimes thought to be normatively illegitimate, at least regarding democracies.

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Andreas Follesdal
University of Oslo

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