Evidence and Inquiry [Book Review]

Review of Metaphysics 49 (1):136-138 (1995)
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Abstract

Many epistemologists classify themselves as either foundationalists or coherentists and assume that the distinction between those epistemic positions is exclusive and exhaustive. Haack explodes that assumption by developing and defending a position which, like foundationalism, grounds knowledge in experience but which incrementally justifies claims by means of coherence. She calls the position foundherentism and takes the crossword puzzle as her model of justification. Just as the clues provide evidence for the correctness of response with respect to individual rows and columns of a crossword puzzle, so empirical experience provides evidence for epistemic claims. Just as the probability of the correctness of one's individual answers increases as the answers fit together in the grid, so the degrees of certainty of one's knowledge increases as bits of empirical evidence fit together in explanatory and logical relations. Her principal explication of foundherentism is developed in chapter 4.

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Daniel Flage
James Madison University

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