Regret for the Defeated Directive

Analytic Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In this paper, I argue an authoritative directive can be defeated (i.e., outweighed) by a reason it defeats (i.e., excludes), where it is rational to feel regret for failing to act as the directive demands. This is the case as, first, it is rational to feel regret when one fails to act on a binding reason, and a defeated reason is still binding unless its triggering conditions have been removed; second, an authoritative directive can be defeated by a more weighty reason it excludes if the latter is still binding; and third, there is no general rule preventing a more weighty excluded reason from defeating a directive.

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References found in this work

Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.
The Morality of Freedom.Joseph Raz - 1986 - Ethics 98 (4):850-852.
Political action: The problem of dirty hands.Michael Walzer - 1973 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (2):160-180.

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