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Accuracy, Language Dependence, and Joyce’s Argument for Probabilism
Philosophy of Science 79 (1):167-174 (2012)
Abstract
In this article, I explain how a variant of David Miller's argument concerning the language dependence of the accuracy of predictions can be applied to Joyce's notion of the accuracy of “estimates of numerical truth-values”. This leads to a potential problem for Joyce's accuracy-dominance-based argument for the conclusion that credences should obey the probability calculus.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
You've Come a Long Way, Bayesians.Jonathan Weisberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):817-834.
What Language Dependence Problem? A Reply for Joyce to Fitelson on Joyce.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Clark Glymour - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):561-574.
Epistemology, Pettigrew Style: A Critical Notice of Accuracy and the Laws of Credence, by Richard Pettigrew1.Scott Sturgeon - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1319-1336.
References found in this work
A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Objective Knowledge.K. R. Popper - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):388-398.
Objective knowledge, an evolutionary approach.Karl R. Popper - 1974 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (1):72-73.
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