Causation and the Problem of Disagreement

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):773-783 (2021)
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Abstract

This article presents a new argument for incorporating a distinction between default and deviant values into the formalism of causal models. The argument is based on considerations about how causal reasoners should represent disagreement over causes, and it is defended against an objection that has been raised against earlier arguments for defaults.

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Enno Fischer
Technische Universität Dresden

Citations of this work

Broken brakes and dreaming drivers: the heuristic value of causal models in the law.Enno Fischer - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (1):1-20.
Actual Causation.Enno Fischer - 2021 - Dissertation, Leibniz Universität Hannover

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References found in this work

Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Cause and Norm.Christopher Hitchcock & Joshua Knobe - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (11):587-612.
Graded Causation and Defaults.Joseph Y. Halpern & Christopher Hitchcock - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):413-457.

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