Quine on Quantifying In

In Modality and Tense: Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2005)
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Abstract

This chapter provides shorter version of the previous chapter and develops some of its themes. It argues that the status of Quine’s arguments against quantifying into modal contexts varies depending upon whether a logical or a metaphysical modality is in question. Various ways of making sense of de re logical modality are distinguished.

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Kit Fine
New York University

Citations of this work

Ruzsa on Quine’s Argument Against Modal Logic.Zsófia Zvolenszky - 2010 - Hungarian Philosophical Review (Magyar Filozófiai Szemle) (4):40-48.
De Re Belief and Cumming's Puzzle.James R. Shaw - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 56 (1):45-74.
Kaplan’s Counterexample to Quine’s Theorem.Paolo Bonardi - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (2):196-223.

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