The Problem of the Unbridgeable Ontological Gap Between the Brain and Our Private Experiences in Wittgensteinian Terms

Discurso 49 (1):185-203 (2019)
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Abstract

The paper argues that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field.

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Nara Miranda de Figueiredo
Federal University of Santa Maria

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