Saving the truth schema from paradox

Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27 (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper shows how we can add a truth predicate to arithmetic (or formalized syntactic theory), and keep the usual truth schema Tr( ) ↔ A (understood as the conjunction of Tr( ) → A and A → Tr( )). We also keep the full intersubstitutivity of Tr(>A>)) with A in all contexts, even inside of an →. Keeping these things requires a weakening of classical logic; I suggest a logic based on the strong Kleene truth tables, but with → as an additional connective, and where the effect of classical logic is preserved in the arithmetic or formal syntax itself. Section 1 is an introduction to the problem and some of the difficulties that must be faced, in particular as to the logic of the →; Section 2 gives a construction of an arithmetically standard model of a truth theory; Section 3 investigates the logical laws that result from this; and Section 4 provides some philosophical commentary

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,505

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes.Hartry Field - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
Some Notes on Truths and Comprehension.Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):449-479.
An Update of Tarski: Two Usages of the Word “True”.Zhen Zhao - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (3):505-523.
The liar, context and logical form.Lon A. Berk - 2004 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 13 (3):267-286.
A Propositional Theory of Truth.Yannis Stephanou - 2018 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 59 (4):503-545.
The liar paradox and fuzzy logic.Petr Hájek, Jeff Paris & John Shepherdson - 2000 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 65 (1):339-346.
Classical Determinate Truth I.Kentaro Fujimoto & Volker Halbach - 2024 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 89 (1):218-261.
The Semantic Paradoxes and the Paradoxes of Vagueness.Hartry Field - 2003 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 262-311.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
155 (#148,429)

6 months
17 (#175,429)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Generalized Revenge.Julien Murzi & Lorenzo Rossi - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (1):153-177.
A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes.Hartry Field - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox.Douglas Patterson - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):387 - 422.
Paths to Triviality.Tore Fjetland Øgaard - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):237-276.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Introduction to Non-Classical Logic.Graham Priest - 2001 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and the absence of fact.Hartry H. Field - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Logic of Provability.George Boolos - 1993 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references