Thinking Must Be Computation of the Right Kind

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:115-122 (2000)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue for a computational theory of thinking that does not eliminate the mind. In doing so, I will defend computationalism against the arguments of John Searle and James Fetzer, and briefly respond to other common criticisms.

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