On the Value of Intimacy in Procreation

Journal of Value Inquiry 48 (3):349-369 (2014)
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Abstract

What is wrong with anonymous surrogacy and gamete donation? Many feminists have argued that these practices are inherently exploitative or alienating. Yet, one can easily conceive of a world where donating a sperm or egg, and getting pregnant on behalf of someone else are considered highly valuable professional services, which are highly-paid and part of well regulated industries. In this ideal world, no one becomes a gamete donor or a surrogate out of economic necessity or desperation, but because there is a genuine fit between their conception of the good and the fact that procreation requires collective action. In this paper, I argue that what makes these practices morally wrong even under ideal conditions is the lack of intimacy between parties in the procreative chain.

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Luara Ferracioli
University of Sydney

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References found in this work

The paradox of future individuals.Gregory S. Kavka - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (2):93-112.
The non-identity problem.James Woodward - 1986 - Ethics 96 (4):804-831.
Gamete Donation and Parental Responsibility.Tim Bayne - 2003 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (1):77-87.
Intimacy and confidentiality in psychotherapeutic relationships.Robert Lipkin - 1989 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 10 (4).

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