Belief About the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content

New York, US: Oxford University Press (2008)
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Abstract

This book offers a defense of the Property Theory of Content, according to which properties rather than propositions are the contents of our beliefs, desires, and other cognitive attitudes. New arguments for the theory are offered, objections are answered, and applications to problems in the philosophy of mind are discussed.

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BD450.F388 2008

ISBN(s)

9780195341362   9780199866922   0195341368

DOI

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341362.001.0001

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Neil Feit
Fredonia State University

Citations of this work

Centered communication.Clas Weber - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):205-223.
In Defense of De Se Content.Stephan Torre - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):172-189.
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
First-Person Propositions.Peter W. Hanks - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):155-182.
Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.

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