Abstract

ABSTRACT This article aims to show how the originality of Jaeggi’s contribution to recent debates in critical theory clearly emerges if one compares her approach with what in many ways represents its antecedent and constant point of reference: namely, the critical theory of Axel Honneth. This comparison offers a privileged way of grasping the advantages of Jaeggi’s approach with respect to that of Honneth. At the same time, reversing perspective, it permits us to focus on some open problems in Jaeggi’s critical theory, which deserve to be discussed with care. The negativistic, formal and procedural character of her critical theory, while on one hand shielding her approach from the risks to which the most recent theory of Honneth is exposed – historical teleologism and ethical substantialism – on the other hand exposes her approach to the risk of an excess of formalism and proceduralism, rendering it unable to tackle the central problem for any critical theory: namely, the link with a critical praxis and with the struggles for the emancipation of one’s own time.