Predictivism and model selection

European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-28 (2023)
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Abstract

There has been a lively debate in the philosophy of science over _predictivism_: the thesis that successfully predicting a given body of data provides stronger evidence for a theory than merely accommodating the same body of data. I argue for a very strong version of the thesis using statistical results on the so-called “model selection” problem. This is the problem of finding the optimal model (family of hypotheses) given a body of data. The key idea that I will borrow from the statistical literature is that the level of support a hypothesis, _H,_ receives from a body of data, _D,_ is inversely related to the number of adjustable parameters of the model from which _H_ was constructed. I will argue that when _D_ is not essential to the design of _H_ (i.e., when it is predicted), the model to which _H_ belongs has fewer adjustable parameters than when _D_ is essential to the design of _H_ (when it is accommodated)_._ This, I argue, provides us with an argument for a very strong version of predictivism.

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Alireza Fatollahi
Bilkent University

Citations of this work

Akaike and the No Miracle Argument for Scientific Realism.Alireza Fatollahi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):21-37.

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References found in this work

Précis of Inference to the Best Explanation, 2 nd Edition.Peter Lipton - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):421-423.
Why did Einstein's programme supersede lorentz's? (I).Elie Zahar - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):95-123.
Prediction versus accommodation and the risk of overfitting.Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.

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