Physicalism and the argument from supervenience

Annales Philosophici 6:26-38 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper challenges the viability of argument from supervenience in defense of a physicalist position on the place of qualia, the subjective properties of consciousness, in a physical or material world. Physicalism, being an ontological thesis that asserts that the only things that really exist are either physical entities or properties, affirms that every mental attribute must be a physical attribute. However, the existence of a quale as an attribute of a mental state falsifies this affirmation. The physicalist argues that qualia supervene on the physical properties in the human body, and that any problem about qualia is, just like any other scientific problem, resolvable scientifically, either in principle or in practice. This paper argues that supervenience is merely a report of the nature of reality, and not a justificatory ontological affirmation that qualia supervene on physical properties. The paper begins with a short description of physicalism and an account of qualia as distinctive character of consciousness. It further articulates and examines the physicalists’ use of the argument from supervenience to establish that qualia supervene on the physical elements in the world. The concluding part shows the errors in the argument from supervenience, and its implication for the truth of physicalism.

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References found in this work

Concepts of supervenience.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45 (December):153-76.
Thinking causes.Donald Davidson - 1995 - In Pascal Engel, Mental causation. Oxford University Press. pp. 1993--3.
Varieties of supervenience.Robert Stalnaker - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:221-42.
Physicalism.Thomas Nagel - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (July):339-56.

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