Know-how and non-propositional intentionality

In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-113 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper investigates the question of whether know-how can be regarded as a form of non-propositional intentionality.

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Katalin Farkas
Central European University

Citations of this work

Anti-Intellectualism for the Learning and Employment of Skill.Daniel C. Burnston - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):507-526.
Gilbert Ryle.Matt Dougherty - 2023 - Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
Reduction and Reflection after the Analytic-Continental Divide.Jacob Rump - 2021 - In Hanne Jacobs (ed.), The Husserlian Mind. New Yor, NY: Routledge. pp. 117-28.

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.Bertrand Russell - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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