Ethical Judgment and Motivation

In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett, The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 308-323 (2017)
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Abstract

This chapter explores the relationship between ethical judgement writ large (as opposed to merely moral judgement) and motivation. We discuss arguments for and against views on which ethical judgement entails motivation, either alone or under conditions of rationality or normalcy, either at the individual or community level.

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Author Profiles

David Faraci
Durham University
Tristram McPherson
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

Ardent realism without referential normativity.Tristram McPherson - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (5):489-508.

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References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

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